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This Article is about the governance of the Internet naming
system. The subject is fascinating, not simply because the naming
system is an important system affecting the Internet, although it is;
and not because the Internet is important, although it is. The sub-
ject is fascinating because it offers a rare opportunity to examine
and learn from the evolution of an incoherent governance struc-
ture. The naming system is special in that it is the product of a new
technology; it reflects the changes and pressures brought by the
new technology, and involves the interests of government and pri-
vate entities, domestic and international. And while this combina-
tion is complex and special, the players are known and their
motivations are quite familiar: a quest for power and money, a pro-
fessional pride and national patriotism, and deep commitments to
various ideologies. Can we predict or even speculate with some
certainty how this governance system will develop? Regardless of
whether we can, what lessons can we learn from what we see?
How should we approach the questions? How can we generalize
our findings?
The governance of the naming system involves the actors in
the system's infrastructure - the registries, registrars, governments,
the Internet Service Providers, and the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"). The naming system is
designed as a pyramid, with the one source root at the top.' This
pyramid is operated by a number of entities.
© 2003. All rights reserved. No part of this paper may be reproduced or cited without
the permission of the author.
* Tamar Frankel, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
I Under this root, in a secondary line, are ccTLDs, such as ".uk" or ".au," and under
them in the hierarchy are Top Level Domain names, such as ".com,". ".org,". ".gov" and
".edu." Under these Top Level domain names, such as ".edu," are names of educational
organizations, such as Boston University, and under the names of the organizations could
be additional layers, such as ".law," and at the bottom of the pyramid are the names of
individuals, such as "Tamar Frankel."
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The naming system presents many questions. Does ICANN's
policy-making power matter; and if so, to whom? I do not deal
with these issues, but I address them briefly because they constitute
part of the context of my inquiry. ICANN's policy-making is an
important matter. It coordinates some activities among the actors
in the naming system infrastructure. It offers, mostly through
others, some services for the actors in the infrastructure. It has
authority to create new Top Level Domain Names in the United
States under ".us," or otherwise. It has authority to create new
country code Top Level Domain Names ("ccTLDs"), and to ap-
prove (or disapprove) the "delegation" of the operating power of
top level domain names, including ccTLDs. It is involved in, and
can affect, matters concerning conflicts between trademark holders
and domain name holders. It is involved in determining whether a
particular entity is an organization entitled to use ".org," or an edu-
cational institution entitled to use ".edu." ICANN may have the
power to determine the use of domain names in languages other
than English. And the list can be extended to the qualifications
and the duties of registrars and registries that manage top-level do-
main names at different levels.2
ICANN's powers involve money. Every power that ICANN
may exercise and every request that must be directed to it, can, and
usually does, carry a price tag. ICANN can set charges for
whatever services, permissions, consents, or requests for consents it
entertains. To the extent that ICANN can define the scope of its
powers and the price tags that it attaches to the exercise of its pow-
ers, it may indeed build a significant empire that involves the infra-
structure of the Internet naming system and affects the operations
of the Internet.
To WHAT EXTENT DOES ICANN's EMPIRE CONCERN THE USERS?
Indirectly, ICANN affects users in two ways. First, individuals
may be affected by the amounts they have to pay to the registrars.
To the extent that ICANN is instrumental in encouraging competi-
tion among the registrars and registries, it can influence the price
of domain names. Moreover, to the extent that ICANN has power
over the transfer of domain names from one registry or registrar to
2 See Kim G. Von Arx & Gregory R. Hagen, Sovereign Domains, A Declaration of
Independence of ccTLDs from Foreign Control, 9 RicH. J. L. & TECH. 4 (2002) (providing
a short, coherent description).
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another, it can induce competition among them, and consequently,
impact the users. In addition, ICANN's decisions and the
processes it imposes to protect trademark holders can greatly affect
small businesses. In particular, if the protection offered by
ICANN's regime encompasses pejorative use of names by trade-
mark holders, there may be a detrimental impact on small busi-
nesses which were tardy in registering names. In their defense,
entrenched trademark holders will likely assert that such busi-
nesses conceded the use of particular names by failing to register.
How SERIOUS WILL THESE ISSUES BE IN THE FUTURE?
How IMPORTANT WILL THE NAMING SYSTEM BECOME?
To the extent that search engines, such as Google, relieve
users from resorting to domain names in searching for specific
sites, the pressure on short and easily remembered domain names
may be eased. Furthermore, work is being done on a new system
of naming that may be more suitable for the current and future
states of the Internet, especially if it can be combined with tele-
phone and fax numbers for a comprehensive digital information
source.
Yet, some of the issues discussed above cannot be resolved by
a "telephone book" type of search, such as Google. There are
pressures to support the continuation of the system. For instance,
the ccTLDs are being considered as alternatives to geographical
addresses for other communication systems. If this development
takes place, the importance of ccTLDs will grow, and they are
likely to carry with them the current naming system. Moreover,
the longer the system remains in place, the harder it might be to
change it, for people are creatures of habit and the current system
acquires important stakeholders that may not easily give up their
benefits. Thus, the current system is unlikely to disappear soon.
The focus of this article is not on ICANN or its ambitions or
on any problems of accountability that it may pose.3 Neither is the
focus on the technical solutions to the existing system. This article
focuses on an incoherent governance system (including, but not
limited to, ICANN), and its future development.
3 See Tamar Frankel, Report to the Markle Foundation (2002), available at http://www.
tamarfrankel.com.
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A. The Governance of the Naming System:
Tracing the Power Structure
The governance of the naming system consists of a few loosely
connected powerful entities. ICANN is a pivotal component be-
cause it has some management powers over the system, and be-
cause the naming system is designed as a natural monopoly.
However, although ICANN has indicated a clear desire for more
power and money, it is not necessarily the strongest member of the
group as its powers are vested by default.4 Its competitors, mostly
foreign governments and United Nations institutions, such as the
International Telecommunication Union ("ITU"), can offer the
same or even better services than ICANN. These competitors re-
frain from doing so by "negative consensus" - none of the partici-
pants agree that any of the others will control the Internet naming
and numbering system. Indeed, if the ICANN agenda threatened
any of its competitors' vital interests, these competitors would sig-
nal that they are ready to take over, or consider taking over,
ICANN's functions. While ICANN and its representatives may
yearn for more leverage with respect to governance of the system,
its potential competitors effectively limit its ambitions.
Accordingly, ICANN is a weak member of the naming system
governance structure, except for three facts. First, ICANN derives
its power from a contract with the United States Department of
Commerce. The United States is not inclined to relinquish its in-
fluence on the system any time soon. Second, the actual operation
of the root is in the hands of another organization in contract with
both the United States Department of Commerce and ICANN.
Third, ICANN's competitors have not managed to establish a suf-
ficiently stable coalition for a sturdier power structure.
4 See Tamar Frankel, The Managing Lawmaker in Cyberspace: A Power Model, 27
BROOK. L. REV. 859 (2002) (examining the puzzle of ICANN as a weak monopoly. Al-
though it controls the Internet naming system and its "root," ICANN is quite weak in its
freedom to exercise this power and has a limited ability to raise funds. The article analo-
gizes ICANN's environment to that of a monopolist in a "contestable market" where the
monopolist achieves its position because it can profitably offer a price which is lower than
the price that other competitors can offer. However, if the competitors are able to enter
and exit the market without cost or with very low cost, their ability to do so constrains the
monopolist from raising its prices. If the monopolist charges higher prices, its competitors
will enter the market, and when competition drives the prices down to an extent that
makes it unprofitable for them, the competitors will exit. Hence, in order to enjoy its
preferred position, the monopolist will choose not to raise its prices above the prices that
its competitors find profitable).
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The strongest support for ICANN, however, is the fear of Internet
disintegration. That is what feeds cooperation among all the
parties.
This glue of cooperation is reminiscent of the first constitu-
tional assembly in the United States. The various States had differ-
ent objectives and many disagreements. What brought them
together was the War of Independence against the British. To-
gether they were stronger. Defection meant a danger to survival of
each and all. In the Internet, defection from some, but not all,
structural arrangements may mean a danger to connectivity, for
each and all, which is also a form of survival. The naming system
may belong to this structural arrangement.
However, parties' motivations in changing the status quo dif-
fer. ICANN, for example, is interested in signing contracts with,
and gaining funding from, the registries of the ccTLDs. Most regis-
trants are far less eager. As one of ICANN's directors noted, "no
agreements can be reached unless all parties want to play."
5
None of the other parties involved has a significant power ad-
vantage over the others. Even though the Department of Com-
merce seems to be in control, it is also bound by legal limitations in
exercising power over ICANN. The purpose of this self-limitation
becomes clear when one examines the history of ICANN's crea-
tion. During the late 1990s, when the Internet emerged as an "in-
formation highway" and a tool for commercial expansion, the
United States government was hard pressed by a number of gov-
ernments to relinquish its control over the root and "international-
ize" the naming system. The United States, however, was not of
the same mind, and some strongly argued for the United States
retaining its power, especially since American taxpayers had fi-
nanced the building and development of the Internet in the first
place.
The United States government reacted by offering a binding
self-limitation that significantly weakened its control over the root.
The United States government limited its own ability to change its
position, under the current federal law. The U.S. facilitated (but
did not "establish") the creation of a type of corporation that the
government could not directly "control." Under federal law, the
executive branch may "establish" and "control" a private sector
5 ICANN Intrigues - The Jonathan Cohen Interview - Part 2, DEMYS NEWS SERVICE, at
http://www.demys.net/news/2002/1O/O2_oct_22_icannintrigues.htm (Oct. 22, 2002).
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corporation only pursuant to a congressional statute.6 Arguably,
ICANN is not a government corporation; the executive branch did
not establish it, nor does it control it.
Nevertheless, ICANN is strongly bound to the United States.
It is a nonprofit corporation organized and governed under Cali-
fornia state law, although a very strange type of nonprofit corpora-
tion indeed; it still exercises vague and semi-governmental powers.
It is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States courts and the
California Attorney General. In addition, although the Executive
cannot control ICANN as a government corporation, the Execu-
tive may, under American law, contract with private sector corpo-
rations for the performance of services. The Department of
Commerce has entered into such a contract with ICANN and with
the actual operator of the root (Verisign). The Executive has dis-
cretion to change the operator and manager of the root by con-
tract.7 Because the contracting party is the Department of
Commerce, Congress has a measure of power to -supervise the De-
partment, and its activities, including the contractual arrangements
that it has made with ICANN. Congress can also require the Gen-
eral Accounting Office to research and investigate such contract
arrangements, and the Office has indeed done so upon request
from Congress.8 Nonetheless, the U.S. government in fact has the
ultimate power over the root. ICANN is "potentially in a position
to say no [to requests by other countries] but the United States has
its thumb fully on the group and if the United States says someone
doesn't get on, then they don't get on."9
Initially, the U.S. government expressed an intention to relin-
quish its ties with ICANN after the first three-year contract with
6 See Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 31 U.S.C. § 9102 (2000).
7 Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/domainname/icann-memorandum.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004) (original
agreement); National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Management of Internet Names and Addresses, at http://www.
ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2004) (listing subse-
quent amendments).
8 See 31 U.S.C. § 712 (2000) (granting Comptroller General power to investigate use
of public money); 31 U.S.C. § 717 (2000) (granting Comptroller General power to evaluate
programs and activities of United States government); 31 U.S.C. § 716(a) (2000) (requiring
agencies to make information available to Comptroller General and granting Comptroller
General power to inspect agency records). The Comptroller General has the power to
delegate its duties to the General Accounting Office. 31 U.S.C. § 711(2) (2000).
9 ICANN Intrigues- The Jonathan Cohen Interview- Part 2, supra note 5.
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ICANN had expired. However, when the time arrived, the U.S.
government instead renewed the contract and shortened the con-
tract period to one year. In September 2003, the government again
renewed the contract, this time for three years. 10 Today the United
States has shown no inclination to fully relinquish its control of the
root, as tenuous as that control may be. One can speculate about
the reasons for this change in policy. Among them may be the fact
that ICANN was expected to develop as a stand-alone semi-inter-
national government entity accountable to the actors in the infra-
structure of the Internet, its servicers and its users. It was expected
to develop legitimacy and stability as a governing body. That, how-
ever, did not happen. Perhaps as the importance of the naming
system has risen, the possible disadvantages of relinquishing con-
trol over the system have risen as well. For these reasons, it seems
that the United States would like to maintain the status quo, but
reduce the tensions that have arisen as a result of its control.
An examination of the naming system's history and the history
of other relationships among actors in the Internet infrastructure
seems to reflect loose organizations, splinters, and further splinters.
It is as if the organizations reflect the Internet's structure. This
hybrid of organizations and loose relationships is not used in the
business context. ICANN, however, is not a business organization.
It is led by business interests but exercises functions that are part
governing and part technical "policies," with which businesses are
not familiar.
The multi-faceted nature of the issues is also extraordinary.
For example, ccTLDs raise issues on various levels. One issue con-
cerns the "ownership" of the names. This issue may relate to the
trademark area and to the right of third parties to use the name.
Another view of the names relates to the right to insert the names
in the root. Only that appearance would allow Internet messages
to reach their destinations. A third aspect of the names is the right
to manage them, and that issue involves the right of the registries
to appear in the root. Without such a right, the registries will not
receive Internet messages for transfer.
In the last analysis, however, the existence of a country and
the business of the registries of the ccTLDs depend on their ap-
10 Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Amendment 6, at http://www.
icann.org/general/amend6-jpamou-17sepO 3.htm (Sept. 17, 2003).
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pearance in the root. The party that has the power to decide which
name will be inserted and which will be removed masters much
power. It need not necessarily be the party that operates the
root.1 It is the one that makes the decision. However, even this
power is not unlimited. It depends on the consensus of the other
Internet infrastructure actors to look to the root as the authorita-
tive address book. It also depends on the absence of any alterna-
tive system that can bypass the root and reach the same results.
Although there may be some routes through others who are on the
root, these roundabout ways are not preferred. Not everyone
agrees with this statement. Some suggest the creation of a differ-
ent root. Arguably, the registries of the ccTLDs can create their
own coordinating entity and refrain from resorting to ICANN or
the operator of the current main root. But this system does not
seem to have attracted the registries.
B. The Nature of the System's Power Structure
To the extent that foreign governments wish to make changes
in the root or in the identity of the registries that manage their
ccTLDs, the governments must resort to ICANN. ICANN's deci-
sions are likely to be influenced by the Department of Commerce's
position, which may be influenced by Congress. All actors have
constrained powers. Some constraints are self-imposed, like those
of the United States Department of Commerce. The government
of France commenced an antitrust action against ICANN, but de-
cided to put the action in abeyance, at least for the time being.
There is also a self-imposed limitation, but with greater discretion.
The powers of all parties, however, are constrained by the potential
powers of the other parties. This is not necessarily, however, a bal-
ance of power situation like the one found in most Western consti-
tutions. The limitations that each party exercises on the powers of
others are negotiable and not institutional. This distinction will be
discussed later in more detail.
In sum, ICANN's power hangs on the thin reed of a short-
term contract with the Department of Commerce. But the power
is strongly supported by the desire of the U.S. government to main-
tain its hold on this thin reed. The other power holders, although
11 This party need not have the authority to determine the trademark aspects of the




unhappy with U.S. dominance, are reluctant to cede control to any
other power holder, and none are ready to terminate their connec-
tivity with the Internet. Even China, a country that has a strong
political drive to control the substance of the communications of its
citizens through the Internet, maintains its existing channels to the
Internet. 12
The governance of the naming system is unique in its vague-
ness both with respect to the exercise of power and the substance
of the policies that regulate the exercise of the power. This type of
structure can best be described by the ad hoc limits that each party
can impose on the others rather than by the areas reserved to each
party by consensus, or by the functions that each party performs, or
by rules which the majority of the stakeholders support.
The governance of the Internet naming system is at a cross-
roads, as it has been since its creation. An analogy to two familiar
governance models shows that it fits neither. One model is a
power structure prescribed by a general law and equally applicable
to all members of defined classes of the governed as well as the
governing bodies. The law can be changed only in accordance with
a prescribed process that involves not only the lawmakers but also
others to whom they are accountable. Although the system is op-
erated in part by ICANN, which seems to be organized under a
state corporate statute, the governance of the naming system as a
whole does not fit this model. In addition, ICANN's organizational
structure is evolving. The identity of the stakeholders is still sub-
ject to debate and continuous study. The ability of the recognized
stakeholders to nominate governing bodies is not secure. In fact,
the idea that ICANN should reflect a democracy, and especially
that the democracy should include the users, has all but been aban-
doned as unworkable. There is too great a danger of capture by
unacceptable elements and too great a danger of unacceptable
nominees to the board and other governing bodies.
The latest attempt to find a way to democracy without these
dangers is the establishment of delegates to nominating commit-
tees and the establishment of the board's own Governance Com-
12 China Steps Up Internet Control with Video Surveillance in, CHANNEL NEWS ASIA, at
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp-asiapacific/view/81 3 2 0/l/.html (Apr. 22, 2004),
(stating that although China is trying to reap the benefits of the Internet, it also attempts to
control the content of the messages that reach China).
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mittee. 13 All these activities are legal in the sense that they are
backed by ICANN's articles of association. The substance, how-
ever, commands further experimentation and study. That ap-
proach should be commended as truly cautious. Realistically,
rather than a matter of utopia, however, the studies tend to
lengthen and maintain the status quo.
As a matter of utopia, I would like to see some principles,
standards, guidelines, and specified mechanisms to achieve them.
These would have the effect of limiting discretion and a test by
which to judge discretionary decisions. Since these are missing, I
am basing my observations on reality as I see it. In addition,
ICANN's articles have become increasingly flexible. Most of its
constitutional provisions are in the bylaws and not in the articles of
association. Not that it makes much difference in this case, since
there are few other bodies that can voice their concerns and en-
force their opinions on any changes. Bylaws, however, are deter-
mined by the board. Even though they are intended for limited
purpose, such as process and organizational matters, these bylaws
contain significant constitutional powers. The changes are there-
fore made whenever the board finds them desirable or wise, but
with little input. To be sure, the board holds meetings on the
changes at times and can then make the changes it likes. This real-
ity renders the bylaws and ICANN's structure very flexible.
ICANN reacts not within its structure and rules but by changing its
structure and rules.
The other model, which the governance of the naming system
resembles superficially, is the market. The parties use their power
to strategically negotiate a division and balance of power, and the
financing of governance activities. Parties may establish power re-
lationships by private agreements and understandings. Usually
such agreements affect only the parties, but there are cases in
which they influence third parties.
Parties that agree with ICANN may divide and balance power
relationships pursuant to contracts, which may contain "constitu-
tional provisions" that seemingly affect only the parties - ICANN
on the one hand and the other party on the other hand. These
contracts, however, include a provision that requires parties to a
13 See Preliminary Report, at http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-12marO3.htm
(Mar. 12, 2003) (nominating committees from academic organizations and ccTLDs and
establishing a Board Governance Committee).
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contract with ICANN to comply with ICANN's future policies.14
ICANN's policies will therefore be deemed the law of the naming
system land, just as congressional laws apply to all without a condi-
tion of supporting consensus. The problem is that ICANN is not
constituted like the Congress, and is subject to far fewer accounta-
bility measures than either a private sector or a public sector cor-
poration. Moreover ICANN's powers are only vaguely defined
and are subject to heated debates. Therefore, its freedom to design
future policies would open the door to expansion of its powers.
These policies can vest in ICANN's broad discretion not only with
respect to the contract party but also with respect to its own pow-
ers vis-a-vis the contract party. The provision "gives ICANN a
stranglehold over different [countries'] domains."15
It is not surprising that foreign countries and the registries of
ccTLDs objected to the contract language. The more parties sign
the contract, however, the more expanded ICANN's power can be-
come. This pattern will seemingly continue, unless the contracting
parties agree, at some future date, to enter the naming arena as
competitors and restrain ICANN by taking it over, or by breaching
their contracts and seeking its invalidation.
Thus, the current governance of the naming system seems to
reflect the second model of a market more than the government of
a private or public organization. To be sure, markets also function
under a number of basic rules to which all players must subscribe.
But these rules can be negotiated with greater freedom and flexi-
bility. In the case of ICANN, the flexibility is even greater. The
rules are established not between two parties to a bargain but be-
tween a ruler (monopolist) and the ruled (all the parties that inter-
act with the monopolist). History seems to repeat itself. James I,
the British King, granted "odious monopolies" that led to a public
outcry and culminated in the Statute of Monopolies of 1624.16
Most importantly, the rules may end up affecting ICANN's power
not only vis-a-vis the contracting parties but other third parties as
well.
If the contract provisions are the same for all parties, the con-
tracts form an unintended coalition among those who signed them.
14 Model ccTLD Sponsorship Agreement, § 5, at http://www.icann.org/cctlds/model-
tscsa-31jan02.htm (Jan. 31, 2002).
15 Kieren McCarthy, Kangaroo Domain Court, TiE REGISTER (London), Dec. 13,
2001, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/20O1/12/13/kangaroo-domainCourt/.
16 See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 13-14 (2d ed. 2001).
2004]
460 CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW
If the contracts differ, depending on the power relationship among
the parties, the contracts can be analogized to "private laws." The
market in which ICANN and other power holders operate is a mar-
ket for rules.
Usually, rulers do not negotiate individual governance deals
with their subjects, but seek to establish rules to which a majority
of their subjects agree or reach consensus. But in the case of "pri-
vate laws" some parties may fare better than others depending on
their bargaining powers and depending on the support they receive
from others. Thus, the rules are not predictable and leave broad
discretion to the ruler. The contract format gives the false impres-
sion of a consensual "democratic" regime rather than a regime of
rules imposed from above. In fact, the contract format is likely to
open the door to corruption, as the history of corporate law and
other laws demonstrates.
Legislatures granted corporate charters not on the basis of a
general statute, but on the basis of private laws and legislator cor-
ruption.17 Scandals of corruption led to the general corporation
laws that we have today. The government has no discretion to
deny applicants a charter, except as defined in the law. Otherwise
it must grant a charter. Further, the rules under which the charters
are granted apply equally to all applicants. This does not mean
that ICANN's method leads to similar corruption. It means that it
could lead to such a problem and emulate history.
All participants in the governance structure of the naming sys-
tem follow two principles, with which all seem to agree. First, all
participants hold their power in trust for the well being of the In-
ternet and its users worldwide. Second, country code registries are
holding their power in trust for the citizens of the country whose
name they service. But these general principles are not sufficient
to create acceptable detailed rules by which all parties will use their
power to achieve the common goal, or induce them to trust each
other to implement the goal in the same way. Hence, the existence
of the "private ordering" mechanism. There is, however, one rule
or strong preference that constrains all players, and that is the pref-
erence to maintain, and be connected to, the Internet. This prefer-
ence drives all players to cooperate.
17 LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICIES: MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 5 (1982) (describing how legislative privilege of charter resulted in temptations
and corruption). As incorporation became a "matter of economic necessity," it led to the
passage of general corporate laws.
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C. A Proposed Approach. Game Theory
How will ICANN's governance structure develop, and what
form will it ultimately take? Assuming that no party is strong
enough to dictate the answer to this question, how can the answer
be predicted? In this Article, I propose a method that may lead to
a way of thinking about it, rather than a plain prediction. I focus
on the interaction among the main actors of the naming system and
I attempt to discern patterns of behavior. If these patterns con-
tinue, then through them, a "habit" or "path dependence," as well
as a consensus, may emerge, leading to rules that will form a more
stable and predictable governance structure. This result, however,
may merely constitute a hope. We may find that the parties' be-
havior is so strategic as to make future behavior and binding rules
unpredictable.
For the purpose of this discussion, I assume that the structure
of the Internet naming system remains the same, and that ICANN
and its potential competitors will continue to "muddle through"
under few rules to which all subscribe. Although it seems as
though muddling through is entirely fortuitous, opportunistic, po-
litical, subjective, changing, and undisciplined, I believe that there
are pointers towards more consistent trends.
That is where game theory can help. One type of game theory
is a zero-sum game. In such a game, one party's gain is another
party's loss. The calculation of such a game is relatively simple.
But reality is usually more complex, and to reflect this complexity,
there developed a non-zero-sum game theory. Under that theory,
in most cases, both parties will either gain or lose unless they coop-
erate. More often, the pie must be sliced and shared or there will
be no pie. This situation resembles that of the parties involved in
the Internet naming system.
Game theorists use mathematical models to quantify results
and control wayward ideas and assumptions. This paper does not
use a mathematical model, and I do not have the knowledge to
develop such a model. But the ideas outlined in this paper can be
tested by a mathematical model and implemented with the use of
available data. I do not purport to offer solutions to the various
conflicts that arise between governments, the registries of their
country code names and others, but the suggested method is help-
ful to provide a structure for a discussion on the current and un-
known future issues.
2004]
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I started by attempting to limit the subject to the interaction
between governments and the registries of the countries' top-level
domain names ("ccTLDs"). The relationship among these two
parties is particularly interesting, not only because the relationship
has not yet been settled, but also because the governments consti-
tute the ultimate power holders in the market of the naming and
numbering system. I quickly discovered, however, that this focus
can only be a starting point. Like most interactions concerning the
naming and numbering system, the interactions between the gov-
ernments and the ccTLD registries involve ICANN, the United
States, other governments, and other actors in the market for
power over the Internet naming system. The relationships cannot
be limited to these two parties without considering the others' po-
tential and actual intervention. Those other power holders form
the context and the environment in which the governments and the
registries operate and relate.
In sum, the naming system today has not matured into a gov-
ernance structure under predictable fixed rules. The main rules,
especially in relation to the governments and their registries, are in
a state of flux and at a stage of negotiation between ICANN on the
one hand, and the governments and registries on the other hand. It
may well be, however, that if the non-zero-sum game that the par-
ties are currently playing could be modeled, the model would un-
cover latent patterns of governance to which all parties subscribe.
This paper is a call to start this research process.
D. A Thumbnail Sketch of a Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory
Game theory is used to study conflict situations involving op-
posing party interests.18 In such situations, each player selects a
strategy, or an action or set of actions, and the payoffs, or results to
the parties, can be quantified and arranged on a matrix. 19 A game
is considered a "zero-sum game" if one party's loss is another
party's gain, and the sum of all payoffs to all players, positive and
negative, is zero.a° An example of such a zero-sum game is a two-
player poker game in which one player's winnings equal the other
player's losses.21
18 See J.D. WILLIAMS, THE COMPLEAT STRATEGIST 2-3 (rev. ed. 1966).
19 Id. at 14-20.
20 Id. at 15.
21 Id. at 14-15.
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A game can also be a "non-zero-sum game," which is funda-
mentally different from a zero-sum game. In a non-zero-sum
game, it is possible for all players to gain or for all of them to
lose.22 In such a game, "there is no universally accepted solution
... no single optimal strategy that is preferable to all others, nor is
there a predictable outcome. '2 3 The players have both comple-
mentary and non-complementary interests. Therefore, their game
includes elements of cooperation as well as competition. This
game is more likely to reflect the reality that an optimal solution is
neither automatic nor easily found.
One example, often used in literature, of a non-zero-sum game
is the "battle of the sexes." Both a husband and wife have a very
strong preference to spend the evening together, but she wishes to
go to the boxing match while he wants to go to a ballet perform-
ance. Since both strongly desire to go together, if each has his or
her way both lose more than they gain.24 However, this leaves
them in a quandary, in which a solution is neither automatic nor
uniform.
A number of strategies are available to this couple, depending
in part on their own preferences.25 First, each party can change its
own utility values, as well as that of the partner, by adding events.
For example, if the wife buys two tickets to the boxing match, the
couple would lose the value of the tickets if they go to the ballet
event. The husband may value the loss of the ticket prices more
than the discomfort of watching the boxing match.
Second, the couple may decide to forego both events alto-
gether and to choose an event that is acceptable (but not as accept-
able as the original choice) to both, such as the theater. To be
more effective in seeking this solution each party may develop a
"min-max" strategy. Each party can determine how far it will go
either in its demands or in giving in to the demands of the other.
Each party may make its strategy known to the other party. Con-
sequently, each party may find a second-best choice that would be
sufficiently satisfactory to both parties.
22 See id. at 15.
23 Janet Chen et al., Game Theory, at http://cse.stanford.edu/classes/sophomore-college/
projects-98/game-theory/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
24 See MORTON D. DAVIs, GAME THEORY 88 (rev. ed. 1983).
25 One strategy, which is inapplicable in our case, is when one or both parties refrain
from communicating. If they do not communicate, they can neither threaten nor promise
rewards to each other in the future.
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Third, the parties can use threats and promises to induce the
other to agree. A "threat" in a non-zero-sum game is a statement
communicated to another player that the player would select a cer-
tain strategy, hoping to influence the behavior of the other
player.26 For example, in a buyer-seller situation, the seller could
state that it would not sell the item for less than a certain price.
The seller is hoping to encourage the buyer to agree to buy at the
seller's desired price, knowing that if the sale is not made, the re-
sult will be adverse to both players.2 7 Similarly, in the "battle of
the sexes" situation, either player may threaten to attend his or her
preferred event alone, if necessary, in an effort to influence the
spouse to attend that event as well.28
"A threat is effective only to the extent that it is plausible. 29
A threat is less plausible if the possible payoff to the threatening
party is more adverse.3 ° If the players cannot communicate, then
neither can they threaten.31 Since a threat requires communica-
tion, a player that refuses to communicate with the other not only
eliminates the possibility of a threat from the other player, but
eliminates his own threat as well. Other threats and promises are
possible as well. The husband may threaten to not accompany his
wife to her favorite events in the future in light of the high utility
that he has put on the current event. The parties may also use
rewards. For example, the wife may agree to give the husband the
book he liked or the trip he was hoping for. Exchanges may be
arranged as well, such as "we alternate in going to events each
party likes."
Fourth, a party dealing with numerous other parties may
adopt the strategy of "divide and conquer," attempting to negoti-
ate with each of the other parties separately. Even though the lone
negotiator may reduce her costs when negotiating with a group
rather than with an individual, she may confront a stronger oppos-
ing party and have less of an opportunity to gain from a disparity in
bargaining power.
Fifth, the parties may agree to have their conflicts resolved
with the help of a third party, such as a good friend or a psychia-





31 Id. at 95.
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trist, if in a family conflict, or an arbitrator or mediator if in a busi-
ness conflict.
The example of the battle of the sexes represents everyday fa-
miliar relationships. But the example is surprisingly suitable to re-
lationships in other contexts as well, including relationships within
commercial and political organizations, and among market parties.
I use the term "market" very broadly to denote non-organizational
relationships, even though markets are also subject to rules and
required patterns of behavior without which no interaction among
parties can exist for very long.
32
The actors in the Internet naming system infrastructure play a
''simultaneous game." A "simultaneous game" is one in which all
players make decisions, or select a strategy, without precisely
knowing the other players' strategies. Even though the decisions
may be made at different points in time, the game is simultaneous
because each player has no information about the decisions of
others. Thus, it is as if the decisions are being made
simultaneously.33
A Nash equilibrium, named after mathematician John Nash, is
a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has an
incentive to unilaterally change its action. Players are in equilib-
rium if a change in strategies by any one of them would lead that
player to earn less than if it remained with its current strategy. For
games in which players randomize (i.e. use mixed strategies), the
expected or average payoff must be at least as large as that obtain-
able by any other strategy.34
A Nash bargaining scheme may be helpful in the ccTLDs sce-
nario as well. This scheme suggests that the objective of a bargain-
ing party is to make an agreement that is as favorable to it as
possible and at the same time avoid demands that would put obsta-
cles on making an agreement. A party that is willing to settle for
terms that are only slightly more advantageous to it than not hav-
ing an agreement is likely to make an agreement. A party that
insists on favorable terms is less likely to make an agreement.
32 See Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and
Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REv. 389 (1993).
33 Game Theory Dictionary, at http://www.gametheory.net/Dictionary/Simultaneous-
Game.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2004). Simultaneous games are represented by the nor-
mal form and solved using the concept of a Nash equilibrium.
34 Game Theory Dictionary, at http://www.gametheory.net/Dictionary/NashE-
quilibrium.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
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However, if one party knows the "break point" of the other, it
would insist on that break point to its advantage. That is why par-
ties act as if they are uninterested in agreements when they are
desperate to reach one. This is also why parties refrain from nam-
ing their price or demand more than they are willing to accept
when they do not know the price that the other party may be will-
ing to accept.
This Article traces the activities of the registries of the
ccTLDs, the governments and ICANN, to examine whether they
reached equilibrium in their relationship, where they failed to
reach such equilibrium, and the direction that they are taking after
such failure.
E. The Parties' Utility Function
A "utility function" quantifies the players' preferences so that
the payoffs will reflect the change in utility to the parties. In a
non-zero-sum game, the parties may have different preferences,
and their choice of strategies may depend on their utility functions.
In the battle of the sexes example, the husband may love ballet
passionately and consider it the most important event of the year,
or he might hate the boxing spectacle because of some childhood
memory. Each player may have the same or a different intense
feeling of altruistic satisfaction in "sacrificing" his or her wishes to
the desires of others, or of "winning" and controlling the other, and
these feelings may determine strategies. Each party may expect or
know that the other will reciprocate (or not reciprocate) in the fu-
ture in the same or other ways, which may also determine
strategies.
Similarly, governments may put different values on Internet
connectivity for their residents. For example, China values the
commercial benefits of the connectivity, but puts a higher value on
controlling the substance of the messages that its residents send
abroad, even though this control slows the pace of the messages
and reduces the efficiency of the Internet for China's residents.
Further, the balance of power and dependence of the parties on
each other may not be equal, in which case they may choose differ-
ent strategies in negotiating with each other.
Not all strategies help reach a long-term solution that is satis-
factory to both parties, or even to a single party. Reciprocity can
35 See MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY 62-65 (rev. ed. 1983).
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be negative as well as positive. Long-term memories of a party's
resentment may backfire in a later situation when the "winner" is
more vulnerable. It is not unusual for parties to reach an impasse
and either go to their chosen event alone or not go to any event
altogether, creating a lose-lose situation. These patterns of behav-
ior can be modeled 36 to provide lessons for those who seek to learn
how to behave in the future. The patterns may also help predict
the future for those who are locked into their behavior and un-
likely to change it.
F. Governance by Contract Negotiations And
the Actors' Positions
Had the naming system been governed more by fixed rules
and less by negotiations, game theory would not have been very
helpful. The theory is useful because the naming system is cur-
rently governed mainly by negotiations. We will therefore discuss
the negotiations that take place between governments, their regis-
tries, and ICANN. In each case, we will identify (1) the weight
each party puts on particular demands (the utility function), and
(2) the strategies the parties use to satisfy these demands.
As discussed earlier, the power infrastructure of the Internet
naming system is composed mainly of governments, registries (and
registrars), ICANN, the Internet Service Providers, and the techni-
cal community. ICANN's president outlined the "essential partici-
pants" in the system as Internet infrastructure providers, major
users, the "relevant technical community," and national govern-
ments. If market pressures are deemed powerful, then large and
small users of the Internet should be included in the list. It seems
that governments hold significant power. But the United States
government, through its Department of Commerce and the United
States Congress, may hold even greater power, although it is exer-
cised somewhat indirectly and discreetly. The root exists physically
in Virginia and is operated by a private corporation, Verisign,
under a contract with the Department of Commerce. The Depart-.
ment has also contracted with ICANN to operate the naming and
numbering system, although the scope of ICANN's operational
and policy powers are unclear.
36 Elmer G. Wiens, Operations Research-Game Theory, at http://www.egwald.com/
operationsresearch/cooperative.php (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
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G. The Governments and ccTLD Registries
1. Applying the Game to the Government-ccTLD
Registry Relationship
The relationship between the governments and their ccTLD
registries is unique and varied. Like all other participants in this
non-zero-sum game, a termination of the relationships between
governments and ccTLDs will produce the worst result for both.
Governments may not be able to remove registries and appoint
others without ICANN's approval. To do so would be to risk possi-
ble termination of the connectivity of their country to the Internet.
The registries of the ccTLDs will lose their business or their ability
to impose their ideology on how the Internet naming system
should be managed in their countries, or sustain losses for other
reasons. I, therefore, conclude that, for different reasons, the worst
scenario for both parties is the termination of the relationship and
the endangering of their connectivity to the Internet.
2. The Governments' Utility Function in Relation
to the Country Code Name
Most governments are likely to give their country's name a
very high subjective value. They may view themselves as trustees
of the name for their people. The country's name may represent to
its people the identity of the country, its history and the legitimacy
of its government. The full riches of patriotism may be compressed
and packaged in the country's name. Giving the name, or control
of the name, away may result in negative popular sentiment. A
country's name can give a purported government the political legit-
imacy that it may otherwise lack or that may be hotly debated and
fought over (e.g., Palestine).37 Removing the name of a splinter
opposition party, especially if it uses violence to make its objec-
tions known, can silence that party and strengthen the political po-
sition of the government. For example, the Spanish government
37 To avoid making a political decision, IANA followed a list by ISO 3166 Maintenance
Agency, and agreed to the re-delegation of Palestine when Palestine was accorded the
status of "Occupied Palestine Territory." IANA, IANA Report on Request for Delegation
of the .ps Top Level Domain (2000), at http://www.iana.org/reports/ps-report (containing
IANA's report and analysis which led to the recommendation to approve the redelega-
tion). See also International Organization for Standardization, at English Country Names
and Code Elements, http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/iso3l66ma/02iso-3166-code-
lists/list-enl.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2004) (stating the complete list of country names
and ISO 3166-1 Alpha-2 code elements - the ISO country code used on the Internet).
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sought the ban of a web site used by Basque militants. The site was
registered by an Australian company, with the server in California,
and administered in France.
In very few situations, a small country may view its name as a
source of income and license it to commercial enterprises (e.g., the
television industry). Some ccTLD names are valuable because
they happen to form an expression, which would be desirable for
companies to have as suffixes in their domain names. The smallest
nation on earth, Tuvalu, has earned over $20 million by licensing its
".tv" domain name to media enterprises. 38 Other countries have
received desirable ccTLD names and some have sold such names.
39
In such a case, the government will identify with the business
interests of the registries. Such a government's utility function is
demonstrated by the following case, which was the first case to in-
volve a ccTLD. In 2000, Expedia, Inc., a U.S. travel service,
brought before the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") a complaint on trademark violation against Domain
Network that registered the domain name "expedia.nu." ".nu" is a
ccTLD of an island state of 2000 citizens managed by New Zea-
land. More than 60,000 ".nu" domain names have been registered
in Niue, by .NU Domain Ltd., a Massachusetts-based firm that ad-
ministered the domain on behalf of the Internet Users Society-
Niue. The registry adopted ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dis-
pute Resolution Policy for all ".nu" registrations. .NU Domain
says it has customers in dozens of countries throughout the world
using its services to register ".nu" domain names, among them
Coca-Cola and International Data Group. WIPO was ready to ap-
38 Charles J. Hanley, Internet Suffix Nets Cash, Concern for Pacific Nation, COMMER-
CIAL APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), July 11, 2004, at A15.
39 See Domains .biz, info Go Live, INDUSTRY STANDARD.COM, June 27, 2001, LEXIS,
News Library, AllNews File (noting that one registrar "offers simulated [top level do-
mains] by using ccTLD names"); NU Path Offered on Internet, AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 25,
1997, at 22 (noting that Niue, a little-known island nation, is selling its ".nu" ccTLD name;
".nu" is pronounced the same as English word "new" and "nu" means "now" in some
languages; because the country is little-known, "its [ccTLD] name carries little national
identity outside its borders"); Nick Clayton, Tonga - The Most Desirable Address?, SCoTs-
MAN, July 16, 1997, at 2 (noting desirability of Tonga ccTLD ".to"); Joey G. Alarilla, In-
fotech Use of Philippines' 'PH' Domain Name Draws Arguments, PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER, Mar. 12, 2001, at 17 (noting concerns about Philippines ccTLD administrator
marketing ".ph" name to telephone companies; noting other desirable names including
".mu" (Maurius) ("music"); ".cc" (Cocos and Keeling Island) ("credit card"); ".md"
(Moldova) ("health care")).
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ply to the dispute the same principles it applied to disputes con-
cerning Top Level Domain Names. n°
It is worth noting that governments' utility functions with re-
spect to country code names have been on the rise. This trend is
evidenced by the activities of a government committee that ad-
vises, and greatly influences, but does not control, ICANN - the
Government Advisory Committee ("GAC"). The membership of
the GAC is one of the constituencies that could demand control of
the root but does not, as long as the other members do not demand
control.
In February 2000, this group recommended that the ownership
of ccTLDs be explicitly given to the countries that they represent.
The GAC's Principles for the Delegation and Administration of
Country Code Top Level Domains, states that the managers of
ccTLDs, known as delegees, must recognize that "ultimate public
policy authority over the relevant ccTLD rests with the relevant
government or public authority."41
This recommendation constituted a response to situations in
which ccTLDs were managed by registries that acted indepen-
dently of the governments whose names they managed.
For example, the .pn domain, which was designated for the Pit-
cairn Islands, until recently was run by a Channel Islands com-
pany, one of whose contacts for registration purposes was an
island resident. Within a few months of the initial delegation in
1997, though, the island territorial government, along with the
United Kingdom, had opposed that delegation, claiming that the
domain was being used predominantly for registration of do-
main names to entities not affiliated with the territory, in ex-
change for a fee collected by the company.42
The GAC did not necessarily require full control by the political
governments, but proposed rules for the establishment and delega-
tion of ccTLD non-government registries of the ccTLDs. Thus, the
utility function of government can run broadly, from political to
social to financial considerations. As the registries become more
40 Daniel Pruzin, WIPO Receives First Request to Rule in Country Code Domain Name
Dispute, INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY (BNA), Mar. 29, 2000, LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABUS
File.
41 Government Advisory Committee, ICANN, Principles For the Delegation and Ad-
ministration of Country Code Top Level Domains, § 4.4 (Feb. 23, 2000), at http://www.
icann.org/Committees/gac/gac/cctldprinciples-23febOO.htm.
42 Jennifer L. Alvey, Government Group Advising ICANN Wants Nations to Control
Country Code Domains, ELECrRONIC COM. & L. REP. (BNA), Mar. 8, 2000, at 232, 233.
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financially profitable, the allocation of this exclusive business can
be used for political and business purposes alike.
ICANN responded enthusiastically to the GAC's
recommendations.
[T]he board of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers signaled its desire to resolve the issue of how
much control governments will have over those who operate
their country code top level domains, like .uk, sometime this
spring ....
... ICANN also decided to give its staff authority to work
with the managers of the ccTLDs, the Government Advisory
Committee, and any other interested parties to develop a final
proposal on how much control governments have over the
ccTLDs....
The GAC issued a recent report that asked for governments
to be given control over who could manage a ccTLD. However,
the GAC report did not specifically address the thorny question
of what the relationship between ICANN and the ccTLD man-
agers would be.43
While the issue remains largely unresolved, and dealt with on a
case-by-case basis, almost every country has now asserted some
form of control over its domain name. Indeed, a recent study by
the ITU found, to its surprise, that 43% of countries had ultimate
control, with another 30% having taken steps toward gaining that
control. Only 7% of the countries had no formal control and no
plans to change that.'
The demands of the GAC, and the actions of its members to
take more control, reflect its utility functions. The Committee rec-
ommended a number of strong protective measures. For example:
[N]o private intellectual or other property rights should inhere
in the ccTLD itself, nor accrue to the delegee ... The delegee
should work cooperatively with the relevant government or
public authority of the country or territory for which the ccTLD
has been established, within the framework and public policy
objectives of such relevant government or public authority...
The delegee, and the delegee's administrative contact, should be
resident or incorporated in the territory and/or jurisdiction of
43 Jennifer L. Alvey, Internet May Have New .com-Type Domains Soon if Net Authority
Acts on Schedule, ELECrRONIC COM. & L. REP. (BNA), Mar. 15, 2000, at 253.
44 Michael Geist, Governments and Country-Code Top Level Domains: A Global Sur-
vey (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/worksem/cctld/kualalumpurO7O4/
contributions/ccTLD-KL-003.pdf.
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the relevant government or public authority. Where the delegee
... [is] not resident or incorporated in the territory and/or juris-
diction of the relevant government, it should nonetheless oper-
ate in a way that is consistent with the laws and public policy of
that relevant government or public authority.4 5
The GAC recommendations also called on ICANN to "act
with the utmost promptness to reassign the delegation" of a ccTLD
once a government tenders evidence that the current delegee does
not have the support of the relevant government. 46 Also, ICANN
should expect cooperation from the government of the relevant
country if ICANN determines that the delegate is operating the
ccTLD in a way that "threatens the stability" of the Internet or the
domain name system.n7
This last proposal recognizes the dual obligation, established
by the founder of the naming system, Dr. Jon Postel, of the regis-
tries both to the country whose name they manage and to the In-
ternet in general to whose infrastructure they belong. Presumably,
if a registry opposes the government's policy, for example, of using
the Internet for developing a country's commerce, the government
would have the power to remove the control of the registry.48 If, in
contrast, the government appoints an incompetent registry, the
registry may object to the appointment, and ICANN may press to
remove the registry.49
45 GAC Principles, supra note 41, at §§ 4.2-4.6.
46 Id. at § 7.2.
47 Id. at § 7.3.
48 But if the government is oppressive, and the registry is outside the geographical
boundaries of the country, a registry may object to transferring its functions for political
reasons. Dr. Postel imposed a trust on the registry not for the benefit of the government
but for the benefit of the people in the country. Who is to determine whether the govern-
ment, recognized by other governments and the United Nations, is the representative and
true trustee of the people? Under the proposed directives the government and its policies
will trump the registry's political views. The policies, however, have not been adopted.
49 Jennifer L. Alvey, Government Group Advising ICANN Wants Nations to Control
Country Code Domains, ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. (BNA), Mar. 8, 2000, at 232-33.
The report also calls on all ccTLDs to have in place a dispute resolution policy.
Such a policy should have several principles reflected in it, such as 'due regard'
for internationally recognized intellectual property law and consumer protec-
tion. Alternative dispute resolution procedures should be conducted online, if
possible, according to GAC, but should not preclude resort to courts .... The
GAC's recommendations are available at http://www.icann.org/gac/gac-cctld-
principles-23feb00.htm. Background on the ccTLD delegation issue is availa-
ble on ICANN's website at http://www.icann.org/cairo2000/cctld-topic.htm.
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Not all governments, however, have the same utility function
in relation to their names. It may well be that the United States
government will part ways with other Western countries. Thus, the
Department of Commerce has been considering the possibility of
opening the ".us" ccTLD space to the private sector. Compared to
England, where the ccTLD is freely used by the private sector (e.g.,
britishtelecom.co.uk), the ".us" domain name is used almost exclu-
sively by state and local governments. It may well be that the value
of ".us" TLD for commercial interests is not as great as in other
countries. Commercial interests do not use the ".us" domain, find-
ing it "too cumbersome and complicated." But according to the
Department of Commerce, expanded use of the ".us" TLD by the
private sector "could alleviate some of the pressure for new generic
TLDs and reduce conflicts between American companies and
others vying for the same domain name."5
Unlike other governments that seem to have a clear position,
the United States seems to be ready to consider a broad array of
possibilities. In its Request for Comment, the Department of
Commerce during the Clinton Administration sought comments on
a variety of policy matters relating to the future of the ".us" do-
main, including: whether ".us" should be treated as an unrestricted
top-level domain like ".com;" how second-level domains should be
allocated; what role states should play in the allocation and regis-
tration of their respective sub-domains; what procedures could be
used to minimize trademark disputes within the ".us" domain, and;
whether there is a particular kind of entity best suited to manage
the ".us" domain.5 1
In addition to the importance of country codes for the respec-
tive governments, the names may gain enormous importance in
electronic commerce for any country. Country codes have been
considered as substitutes for designation of locations, and if that
proposal is accepted, they will attain considerable added value.52
3. The Utility Functions of the Registries of ccTLDs
In general, a government's value of the name is likely to be
higher than the value that ccTLD registries attach to the name, if
50 Commerce Seeks Input on .us Domain; Explores Expanded Private Sector Access,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Aug. 5, 1998, at A-25.
51 Id.
52 Anandashankar Mazumdar, UNCITRAL Group to Begin Discussions on E-Con-
tracting Treaty at March Meeting, BANKING REP. (BNA), Jan. 21, 2002, at 3.
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patriotism comes second to the value of the registries' business.
Registries may manage another name and be as successful finan-
cially. Some registries, however, view themselves as agents of the
state and have the same utility function as the governments, and at
least one had a very high utility as a representative of an Internet
free of government interference. It should be recognized that the
sentiments of the governments with respect to their country's
names are likely to be shared by most large governments. This
leads to a modicum of a consensus.
H. The Strategies: Assertions of Principles and Threats
How do governments that derive higher utility from their do-
main names negotiate to support their claims both to the names
and to control over the registries of their ccTLDs?
1. To Cooperate or Defect?
As stated, all participants in the power infrastructure of the
Internet desire to maintain connectivity and ensure its continued
viability. This desire drives the parties to cooperate. If a party
does not cooperate, it stands to lose more than the others, since it
would lose connectivity to all others while the others would lose
connectivity only to one party. The only way in which all parties
stand to gain is for all to cooperate fully and to unanimously agree
on an alternative. It seems that such a move is far more costly to
any of the parties than the status quo.
Another consideration driving the parties toward cooperation
is the reduction of risk and uncertainty for the interacting parties.
One of the Internet's salient features (and also its strength) is its
openness to any change at a higher level. But for some parties, this
feature can pose significant uncertainty. It can threaten other val-
ues that a party might cherish, such as political stability (as the gov-
ernment defines it). Under these circumstances, a cooperative
agreement to reduce the uncertainty may be welcome among par-
ties that share a similar resistance to the uncertainty.
Parties may weigh passive and active cooperation differently,
depending on the value they assign. Thus, registries of ccTLDs
value active cooperation by contract with ICANN less than
ICANN values the cooperation by contract. In addition, the par-
ties weigh the terms of the proposed or negotiated contracts differ-
ently. While ICANN is more eager to sign and receive power and
funding, the registries are far less eager to actively cooperate.
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Lastly, even though all parties would rather interconnect with
the Internet via the main root, there are some alternatives to such
interaction via other means. These alternative means are not as
attractive and are more costly. The choice of such means may also
lead to negative pressures by other parties. If registries of ccTLDs
choose alternative means, at a higher cost to them, the cost of
ICANN, for example, may be even higher. Not only will ICANN
lose the opportunity to induce the parties to contract on its terms,
but the defecting party may show the way to others, and start a
movement towards the alternative.
2. Legitimizing Claims by Principles-Based Actions
Principles do not necessarily help cooperation. Principles,
however, can clarify the real parties to the contract. Strong princi-
ples can be persuasive, especially to those who are like-minded.
Here are a few principles that were used and the users who used
them:
a. Name ownership in rem.
This principle conflicts with the asserted rights of others to use
a country's name, and indirectly with ICANN's power to designate
the names that appear in the root. Governments that place a very
high value on the country's name have asserted that the name con-
stitutes property, that this property belongs to them, and that the
registries are the government's agents. Thus, the governments
have asserted their dominion over their name and registries of the
name. They have sued companies that have registered the country
names as Internet addresses.53 South Africa has gone further and
enacted legislation that "provided for government control of do-
main administration, instead of government participation. ' 54 It as-
serted its rights to its domain name against the claims of a private
business enterprise that had used the name in its business. The
GAC recommendations also propose clear ownership principles.
These principles, however, have not been adopted by ICANN.
53 ICT and Telecom; Battle for SA Domain Caught in a Legal Web, AFRICA NEWS, Jan.
10, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, AllNews File (noting litigation by South Africa and New
Zealand governments).
54 Deadline for .za Domain Board Nominations Extended, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE (South
Africa), Nov. 21, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, AllNews File.
55 Virtual Countries, Inc. v. Republic of South Africa, 148 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
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b. Power to appoint the registries.
This principle conflicts with ICANN's asserted power to desig-
nate the names that appear in the root, with the asserted rights of
registries that were appointed by Jon Postel. The principle also
conflicts with ICANN's asserted power to disqualify registries. Ad-
ditionally, the principle may conflict with the assertion of registries
that they were vested with their position by Jon Postel. A number
of governments asserted their right to appoint the registries to their
ccTLDs. These asserted rights conflict with ICANN's assertion of
authority to approve or disapprove the "delegation" of the power
to manage their ccTLDs. While governments derive their asserted
right from the name, ICANN derives its asserted right from the
management power of the root.
In the struggle, governments can exercise their power over
their registries so long as the registries are within their physical
jurisdiction, and so long as the identity of the registries does not
change. In such cases the governments can control the registries by
passing laws to this effect. However, when governments wish to
change the identity of the registries and substitute one registry for
another, ICANN, or rather the U.S., has the upper hand. The laws
may be insufficient to formally effect a change without ICANN's
consent. Unless a registry is designated in the database of the root,
the transfer cannot be completed. ISPs will not recognize the new
registry and will continue to recognize the old one. The laws, how-
ever, have powerful effects of threats, as discussed below.
Conflicts between a government and its existing registry can
arise when the two disagree on the use of the Internet and the
power of the government to designate another registry, as illus-
trated in the Australian example. The government was patient, but
was not willing to give up its full priorities. It was a zero-sum game
and the registry lost. The government did not choose the direct
route of legislation to root out the registry, but rather approached
ICANN to mediate and reach an agreement. The Australian gov-
ernment has been historically supportive of ICANN, since the use
of ICANN suited its purposes and undermined the legitimacy of
the registry that claimed entitlement to the function by the ap-
pointment of Jon Postel. Since ICANN is the offspring of Dr. Pos-
tel, the registry's claim to legitimacy was undermined by the
advantage of the Australian government. I suggest, however, that
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if ICANN had supported the registry, the Australian government
could have passed a law to transfer the registry to its choice.
Underlying the relationship between governments and their
ccTLD registries is a conflict of principle. While many, if not most,
governments claim the name as their own, some registries (and
ICANN) claim their right to manage the ccTLD, on behalf of the
free enterprise of the Internet. This claim then leads through
ICANN to the United States as the source of their entitlement.
Ultimately, arguments of principle pit governments that assert
property rights to their names against the United States. There-
fore, the main non-zero-sum game is not only between the govern-
ments and their registries, but also between these governments and
the United States government. In the last analysis, these conflicts
led to disagreements between foreign countries and the United
States through ICANN, or through the actions of Dr. Jon Postel.
Both acted for the United States under contract, although Dr. Pos-
tel was controlled more closely by the U.S. than ICANN is.
These principles, however, are interesting in two respects.
Their users wish to change the status quo with respect to the pow-
ers of the United States. The opposition, wishing to maintain the
status quo, resorts to the past regime. Regardless of the merits, the
relative power of both sides may guide the answer. The current
holder of the power (the root) may have the upper hand for now.
The weakness of the principles is noticeable when one party uses
the opposite principle in other contexts. Thus, ICANN advocates
change when it aims at formalizing relationships especially with the
registries of the ccTLDs, while the latter seek refuge in the status
quo and the past.
3. The Bargains
When a country seeks ICANN's approval to change its regis-
try, ICANN might use the opportunity to extract benefits for its
approval, such as added funds of which it is usually short. The ben-
efits it can extract depend in part on the strength of the applying
country. Small countries and their registries have succumbed to
ICANN's demands, signed its contracts and are paying up. Austra-
lia is a prime example, although that country has long supported
ICANN, and therefore may have found the terms of its contract
more acceptable. In this context, the balance of power among the
parties seems to dictate the outcome.
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Agreements between ICANN and ccTLD registries are the
products of long negotiations, and may have resulted in com-
promises. But the balance of the compromises is difficult to assess
without further investigation of the processes. Because the negoti-
ations are among few parties, and the contracts could affect third
parties that did not take part in the negotiations, some of these
contracts have been renegotiated after they were completed in
light of the strong objection of the third parties. This process of
renegotiation is the result of the one-to-one talks among a few par-
ties when the subject matter of the contract is in fact a rule.
Two main issues have held up agreements between ICANN
and ccTLD operators: power and money. Some ccTLDs would
like to play "a greater role in ICANN's decision-making process."56
The few recent agreements between ICANN and the ccTLD regis-
tries allowed "new or revised ICANN specifications and policies
applicable to the [registry]" to "be established according to proce-
dures that comply with ICANN's bylaws and articles of incorpora-
tion," although ccTLDs are allowed input into the development of
these policies. 7
In addition, the ccTLDs "have clashed with ICANN on ques-
tions about their financial contributions to ICANN. '58 The agree-
ments require ccTLDs to make financial contributions to ICANN
"based on ICANN's total funding requirements ... developed by
ICANN on the basis of consensus."5 9 Most registries are unwilling
to fund ICANN's expanded operations without a stronger power
position in the organization. Meanwhile, the registries of the
ccTLDs have attempted to gain more power in ICANN's structure.
That step may conflict with governments' assertion of full owner-
ship and control over their country codes. Governments' involve-
ment in ICANN's affairs is also limited in principle. Nonetheless,
they are acquiring power increasingly. This renders weaker the re-
gistries that assert independence, and pits foreign governments
against the United States when their interests conflict.
56 ICANN Reaches Agreement with Operator of Japan's Country Code Top-Level Do-
main, INT'L Bus. & FIN. L. DAILY (BNA), Mar. 1, 2002, LEXIS, BNA library, BNABUS
File.
57 See, e.g., ICANN, ccTLD Sponsorship Agreement (.au), § 5, at http://www.icann.org/
cctlds/au/sponsorship-agmt-25octOl.htm (Oct. 25, 2001) [hereinafter ICANNI.
58 Dugie Standeford, Names Council Cracks Down on Non-Dues-Paying Constituen-
cies, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, June 6, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, AllNews File.
59 ICANN, Principles For the Delegation and Administration of Country Code Top
Level Domains, supra note 41, at § 4.6.
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4. Threats
A law is a powerful signal to ICANN (and indirectly to the
Department of Commerce) that another government's demand for
a change in the registry of a ccTLD is serious. It is a signal that,
without weighty reason, such demand should be accepted. The
government can contact the U.S. Department of State and, through
its own channels, exert pressure on ICANN. The problem of the
governments is that their own laws and changes of the registries -
"delegees" - cannot have effect without ICANN's approval di-
rectly or indirectly by the Department of Commerce or the Con-
gress. This is one of ICANN's powers, which the governments, in
their recommendations, desired to eliminate.
In conflicts involving a government or governments, a larger
country has more clout than a smaller country, because it can re-
duce the Internet population by a larger number (thereby prevent-
ing other countries from communicating with a large number of
users) and yet maintain interconnectivity within the country. Yet,
such a country is also more vulnerable if its population and its
economy depend on communications with others through the In-
ternet. Therefore, the number of Internet users in a country can be
more important in determining a country's negotiation strength
than its number of citizens. In addition, a greater impact on world
commerce gives a country more power to make demands concern-
ing the Internet. However, the impact of a limited Internet ex-
poses a country to more risk if it needs not only internal
interconnectivity but also connection to world commerce.
The impact of a party's threat is closely related to its accompa-
nying conduct. The extent to which it binds itself to a demand sig-
nals to the other parties the weight of its utility function. For
example, the European Union demanded recognition of its name
.eu," even though the Union is not a recognized country under the
United Nations rules. In 2000, ICANN's reaction was negative, cit-
ing various problems that recognition of such a regional name
would raise.6' As the demands of the European Union continued,
Congress reacted by proposing legislation, which, if passed, would
have had the effect of precluding ICANN from recognizing ".eu"
before it recognized another Top Level domain name (".kids"),
60 Bruce A. McDonald, International Intellectual Property Rights, 35 INT'L LAW 465,
n.45 (2001), LEXIS, News Library, AllNews File.
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which would be used in the United States. 61 However, during the
same year, ICANN changed its position and stated the reasons why
it might concede to the Union's demand. ICANN found a legiti-
mizing rule that enabled it to accept ".eu" even though it was not
on the primary United Nations list.62
In April 2002, the European Union's Council of Telecommuni-
cations Ministers approved a new ".eu" domain to operate on the
same level as ccTLDs. These government actions represent a strat-
egy of a commitment to a position in the nature of a threat. The
governments' claim to a name is as strong as their claim to the
territory. The European Union that claimed a new ccTLD, how-
ever, did not comply with the definition of a country that ICANN
has followed because the European Union is not a member of the
United Nations. To show its commitment to back its demand, the
European Union passed a directive declaring its new Internet
name.63 The actions have effect within the countries' geographical
boundaries. But the actions also have effect on their gaming to-
wards other registries and ICANN. The law supports the demand
for recognition. This law is difficult to change, not only because of
the process involved, but because of the loss of face and political
requirement for explaining a retreat from the demand. Thus, a law
allows the government to regulate the registry within its bounda-
ries, but the law is also used to notify anyone who might have
power to claim influence over the use of the name that the govern-
ment is committed to asserting its rights to the name, and to the
registry of the name. It is a threat to other parties involved, and it
sets the price of the other party's attempt to disagree.
61 Kevin Murphy, European Domain May be Scuppered by US kids Bill, COm-
PUTERWIRE, July 3, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, AllNews File. However, in December
2002 Congress instead passed legislation creating the new second-level domain "kids.us;"
see also Laura Rohde, Bush Signs Bid for Child-Safe Domain Names, INo\WoRLD DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 5, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, AllNews File.
62 While the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority ("IANA") has a policy to create
new ccTLDs only for codes on the ISO official list of two-letter country codes, the ISO has
another list of codes for administrative subdivisions of these countries ("the ISO 3166-1
list"), and this list includes ".eu." ICANN directed IANA to delegate country codes not on
the ISO 3166-1 list as ccTLDs "only where the ISO Maintenance Agency has reserved a
slot on its exceptional reservation list that covers 'any application of ISO 3166-1 that needs
a coded representation in the name of the country, territory, or area involved."' For criti-
cisms of ICANN's decision, see Dugie Standeford, .EU Decision Stirs Criticism from TLD
Applicants, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Oct. 16, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, AllNews File.
63 .eu Gets Go-Ahead: New Domain for Europe to Go Live in 2003, INTERNET MAG.,
May 1, 2002, at 13, LEXIS, News Library, AllNews File.
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The European Union showed its commitment to the name by
passing a law. The United States agreed, but made the agreement
provisional. We may expect the name to continue so long as the
Union wishes, but we might see a longer period for a final recogni-
tion of the name to emerge, maybe after some formal request to
ICANN or a diluted form of such a request. In addition, we may
see some agreement on the part of the European Union to pay
ICANN directly or through its registry, and that may be accompa-
nied by a place for the European Union on the advisory committee
of the governments.
The concessions may be predicted by an estimate of the value
that each party will attach to it and by the irreversible commitment
that it will make to its demand. However, so long as their demands
are met, it seems that the governments are not as committed to
alter the basic current arrangement. They may recognize that the
ultimate say on the naming system is with the United States. The
United States - both Congress and the administration - may recog-
nize that the naming system is not theirs to control, manipulate, or
use as they wish. They also must recognize that the dissatisfaction
by other governments, or by some independent ccTLD registries,
cannot be ignored and must be addressed.
The reaction of the United States to the demands of other
countries to "internationalize" the Internet demonstrates a similar
method. The United States bound itself under its own laws to re-
duce its control over ICANN by denying ICANN's status as a gov-
ernment corporation (established and controlled by the
government) and reducing its power over the root by maintaining
contractual control.
ICANN's adoption of this strategy is demonstrated in the fol-
lowing story. In the opinion of its staff, ICANN needs funding to
perform its job effectively, and the ccTLD registries are a source of
funding. 64 As long as they do not sign contracts with ICANN, their
undertaking to pay is less assured. ICANN proposed to increase
the involvement of the government in the organization so as to
pressure the registries of the ccTLDs into signing contracts with
ICANN, which would include an undertaking to pay. This move,
which would increase governments' power, drew critics who were
64 Juliana Gruenwald, ICANN Plan for Restructuring Draws Fire from Various Groups,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Feb. 26, 2002, at A-41 (ICANN's president argued
for a $4.8 million current budget increase of 300 to 500 percent).
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concerned with the possible reduced importance of other Internet
constituencies, 65 and increased possible content control of the In-
ternet.66 Whether ICANN will raise its funding, however, is less
clear, since even representatives of the government doubted the
validity of the proposed expansion of ICANN's role in governing
the Internet. 67 Thus, the use of governments to pressure the regis-
tries into signing the contracts did not seem to materialize. In fact,
it may have backfired.
On the other hand, some highly dissatisfied registries
threatened to leave ICANN altogether.68 Others are examining
the possibility of a new organization that would play a more active
role in ICANN's governance, such as a Names Supporting Organi-
zation, which would be made up of representatives from the regis-
tries of the ccTLDs. 69
5. Divide and Conquer
For a number of years, ICANN has attempted to reach an
agreement with the registries of the ccTLDs on a form contract
that they would sign. The attempt failed for a number of reasons.
First, some individual registries rejected the particular provisions of
the contracts, including significant payment obligations, without
commensurate influence on the way in which the payments will be
used. This was the "taxation without representation" argument.
Second, some governments may not have been pleased with
ICANN's assertion of power over their ccTLDs, which the govern-
ments claimed to be their property. Other governments were not
pleased with the assertion of ICANN's power over the registries of
their country codes. Lastly, emotions and self-worth played a part.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 Juliana Gruenwald, ICANN Board Meeting in Ghana to Focus on Structure as Pri-
vate-Sector Driven Group, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Mar. 13, 2002, at A-10
(concern expressed by "William Black, managing director of Nominet, which operates
Britain's ccTLD, .uk, and chairman of a group of European ccTLD operators").
68 Stephen Joyce, Worried About ICANN Responsiveness, ccTLD Managers Form New
Support Group, INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY (BNA), June 5, 2001, LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNABUS File.
69 Juliana Gruenwald, ICANN Board to Take Up Reform Plan Despite Concerns with
Latest Proposal, DAILY REP: FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), June 25, 2002, at A-22. This possi-
bility is now being considered by ICANN in its reorganization. The policy councils would
include the address and numbering council, the generic top-level domain name policy




Registries did not seem to appreciate ICANN's letter to the gov-
ernment seeking assurance that the registries were qualified for the
task.70 Therefore, most registries did not sign.
ICANN then took the long road of negotiating with each reg-
istry separately. ICANN's President announced that agreements
with operators of ccTLDs depend on the willingness of individual
countries to accept ICANN's conditions. In other words, ICANN
will not reduce its demands under the contracts. He conceded that
the process will therefore take longer, but emphasized that ICANN
is in no rush. "However, a member of the ccTLD Supporting Or-
ganization (ccTLD SO) told the board that relations between
ICANN and the ccTLDs have not improved since he issued a
warning about the problem at last year's annual meeting."
"ICANN was insisting that ccTLDs agree that in the event of a
change in registry, ccTLDs will facilitate the transfer to a successor
nominated by ICANN [but] few countries would accept such a
provision. "71
The progress was indeed slow, but some progress was made.
In 2002, ICANN reached an agreement with the registry of Japan's
ccTLD. The registry agreed to recognize "ICANN's role in manag-
ing the Internet's domain name system" and to "provide financial
support to ICANN and to operate the ccTLD in the 'interest of the
Japanese community."' ICANN promised to "ensure the stable
and secure operation of the domain name system and to formally
recognize the Japan Registry Service Corporation as the new oper-
ators of .jp., 72
Few registries have signed such contracts. All but twelve 73 are
holding out for a greater role in the governance of the system, or
lower fees and other more favorable conditions. 74 But they do not
speak in one voice. "There are 240 ccTLDs, all of whom have dif-
ferent views . . .Some of them wanted to explore the option of
70 ICANN Intrigues - The Jonathan Cohen Interview - Part 2, DEMYS NEWS SERVICE,
Oct. 22, 2002, at http://www.demys.net/news/2002/10/02 oct_22icannintrigues.htm (Oct.
22, 2002).
71 Tom Gilroy, ICANN Expects Progress on ccTLDs, but No Surge of Agreements,
President Says, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Nov. 19, 2001, at A-6.
72 ICANN Reaches Agreement with Operator of Japan's Country Code Top-Level Do-
main, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Mar. 1, 2002, at A-42.
73 ICANN, ccTLD Agreements, at http://www.icann.org/cctlds/agreements.html (pro-
viding links to the twelve agreements that ccTLD registries have with ICANN) (last up-
dated June 21, 2004).
74 Id.
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what would happen if ICANN failed, and some of the more ex-
treme ccTLDs put it in terms of leaving ICANN . . . 'There's a
whole lot of other end of the spectrum,' . . . including constructive
input on how to build the Country Code Names Supporting Organ-
ization (ccNSO)." 75 ICANN's powers and functions and the bal-
ance of power among the various constituencies are not settled as
yet. The structure of the organization has been reformed recently,
and is being further negotiated. In sum, ICANN is using the "di-
vide and conquer" strategy while the registries and the govern-
ments have not formed a unified approach, but are nonetheless
very reluctant to submit to ICANN's demands.
6. Arbitration
WIPO is interested in becoming the standard setter (and per-
haps bearer) on some of the issues concerning ccTLDs, and so are
many governments. WIPO, urged on by Argentina, Canada, Den-
mark, France, the U.S. and the EU, has drawn up a code of "best
practices" for use by ccTLD administrators to resolve domain
name disputes,76 and has been involved in resolving numerous such
disputes.77 Furthermore, dozens of countries have voluntary ar-
rangements with WIPO to handle disputes using their country
codes.78 WIPO members such as the United States and the EU are
keen to see "best practice" codes put into place for other countries
to contain the scourge of cybersquatting. One school of thought is
that now that there is this quick and effective procedure against
cybersquatting in the gTLDs, a lot of cybersquatting activity will
move to the ccTLDs.79
Other international organizations, such as the ITU, are also
vying for the position of a "negotiation platform manager." The
ITU has been serving for many years in a similar capacity for pos-
75 Cheryl Bolen, ICANN Board Moves Forward on Reform, Setting Stage for Next
Meeting, Lynn Says, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. DAILY (BNA), Nov. 1, 2002, LEXIS,
BNA Library, BNABUS File.
76 WIPO, ccTLD Best Practices for the Prevention and Resolution of Intellectual Prop-
erty Disputes (June 20, 2001), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/cctld/bestpractices/best-
practices.html; Daniel Pruzin, WIPO to Consider Consultations on Cyberquatting, Other
Domain Abuses, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), July 13, 2000, at 1071.
77 See WIPO, WIPO UDRP Domain Name Cases, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
cases/all-cctld.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2004).
78 See WIPO, Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service for Country Code Top Level
Domains (ccTLDs), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/cctd/index.html (last visited Aug. 5,
2004).
79 Pruzin, supra note 76.
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tal services. Arguably, ICANN has not done better than any bu-
reaucratic organization in terms of time, especially with respect to
policy matters. In addition, the ITU serves as a mediator for stan-
dard setting rather than as a standard-setting power. This ap-
proach is in line with the rapidly evolving development of the
Internet. However, the ITU does not enable the United States to
maintain its current power position as the ICANN structure does.
The role of the ITU may be shaped in the future, but it is not likely
to play the same current role it plays in the postal service context.
7. The Relationship Between the United States and ICANN
Mirrors a Non-Zero-Sum Game
Neither party wishes to sever the relationship. Although the
United States, which in the final analysis controls ICANN by its
contract with the Department of Commerce, desires to keep the
final control over the root, it also desires the control to be in the
form of monitoring rather than overt directives. United States law
precludes the Department of Commerce from controlling ICANN,
unless ICANN is reestablished by statute. However, the Depart-
ment of Commerce does have the power to terminate ICANN's
contract. The Department is sensitive to dissatisfactions with
ICANN. It can therefore make additional demands on ICANN to
correct its operations or shorten its contract term.
Further, like the couple in the hypothetical, we witness
changes in events that tend to press for cooperation rather than
competition. The United States, which had full control over the
root, tied its own hands by avoiding the creation of an ICANN-
type corporation under a statute. Had the United States chosen
this route, it would have had the power to control and manage
ICANN to a far greater degree. But by creating a non-government
corporation, it has legally limited its own power to manage
ICANN. Nonetheless, by contract, it has reserved the ultimate
power to itself, and the ability to influence ICANN by possessing
the power (threat) not to renew the contract. Today, the United
States uses its power to avoid conflicts with other governments and
powerful actors. Since the United States has changed its mind and
no longer promises to release ICANN from its ties to the govern-
ment, a consistent approach or sensitivity to the other governments
is necessary to help gain the trust of other actors and establish a
pattern of cooperation.
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Whether this pattern will continue is unclear. It would seem
that so long as this ambiguous status satisfies the interests of the
United States and can be used to satisfy the interests and demands
of other governments, ICANN will continue to exist. Changes will
be made within ICANN in terms of balance of power, identity of
actors and participants, and processes. The chances of creating a
new structure altogether seem to be low unless the whole naming
system finds another form.
Each of the players in the naming system may have estab-
lished a "minimum-maximum strategy" that dictates how far the
player will go either in its demands or in giving in to the demands
of the other players. For example, it seems that the minimum de-
mands of the United States are to control the geographical place of
the root and the legal arrangement with the organizations that
manage the root. The maximum demand is probably close to the
minimum, and the range is minimal. For the United States the cur-
rent flexible situation seems to be ideal. From the point of view of
other governments, their minimum demands are further removed
from their maximum demands. One main reason is the depen-
dence on the United States' largess and fairness, or dependence on
the United States no matter how fair it might behave. But as long
as the United States has made it clear that it will not relinquish
control, and as long as it accommodates the minimal strategic de-
mands of the other governments, cooperation is likely to continue
and the status quo will be changed only in small steps of "muddling
through."
I. The Platform For Negotiations: Why Are Governments
Interested in ICANN As a Platform For Negotiation?
ICANN can develop into a platform for negotiation. This
platform can develop into a central power, slowly building a power
base through negotiations that put it at the center as a pivotal nec-
essary party, like the central pole in a carousel. The pole is useless
by itself, but all other important parts are tied to it and depend on
it for balance, support and function. However, if the crucial parties
bypass ICANN, and if the distance between them is not great,
ICANN may lose its pivotal power. For example, if the United
States and representatives of governments negotiate directly within
the government committee, then ICANN's staff and board would
have to carry out the agreements among the governments, but
would have little say in these agreements. Currently, it seems that
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for many reasons that should be explored further, the governments
prefer to go through ICANN's personnel and board, even though
they also deal with each other directly and have the option of using
other organizations to get in touch with each other, including the
GAC appended to ICANN.
It seems that the registries of ccTLDs are being organized in
order to have a special say in ICANN. For example, the Number
Resource Organization ("NRO") formed in late 2003 to coordinate
efforts by regional Internet registries in dealing with ICANN.
80
They may also become the voice of the governments whose coun-
tries they serve. It may be that each country will develop some
partial naming system and, perhaps, that some countries may band
together to create regional naming systems that would not impede
the overall naming system but rather reduce its importance. Even
though it seems that ICANN is going in that direction, I do not
believe that ICANN will end up as a power center.
If ICANN evolves into a platform for negotiations to augment
its power rather than to attain a consensus, a far more serious
problem will arise both for ICANN, and indirectly for the United
States. There are international organizations that are far more apt
and have far more experience at reaching consensus. On the other
hand, few organizations involved in ICANN's infrastructure, in-
cluding governments and ccTLDs, are likely to participate in an
authoritarian organization, unless they control it. As the conflicts
between ccTLDs and ICANN sharpen, and given ICANN's unwill-
ingness to police itself, there is a growing pressure to move to other
actors. However, the United States has a stake in keeping ICANN,
and its own control of ICANN, alive. Hence, it has pressured
ICANN to become more transparent and has shortened its con-
tract period.
J. Lessons From the Bargains or Lack Thereof
With respect to the weaker parties, such as some registries and
many registrars, who are lower in the power hierarchy, ICANN has
been successful in reaching agreements that fit its preferences.
Whether or not these agreements fit the preferences of the weaker
parties, the weaker parties likely concluded that they would be bet-
ter off with these agreements than without them. Thus, the equilib-
80 NRO, The Number Resource Organization (NRO) (Oct. 27, 2003), at http://www.nro.
net/docs/mou.html#doc (proposed Memorandum of Understanding).
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rium between ICANN and such parties has been established, and
may be described as the rule for parties of this ilk. However,
ICANN does not seem to consider these parties as a sufficient
source of funding, nor as the foundation of power. Early on,
ICANN attempted to impose a relatively small charge on each do-
main name holder. However, the negative reaction to this attempt
from Congress and other significant competitors to ICANN's
power caused a quick withdrawal of this proposal. Thus, these par-
ties are not generally ICANN's power competitors. They are not
organized and do not have the national or international clout nec-
essary to induce ICANN to change its position. Therefore, it
makes sense for ICANN to focus on the registries of the ccTLDs as
a source of funding, and on the governments as a foundation of
power or the source of funding or the party able to pressure the
ccTLDs to be more generous with their payments.
ICANN was not successful in reaching an agreement with the
organized group of ccTLD registries. They objected to the contract
provision that bound them to future policy decisions, that is, to the
assertion of power, and they did not consider ICANN's services
sufficient consideration for the payments they were making and
were required to make. In consideration for these two concessions,
they demanded greater power of participation in the decisions that
would affect them. ICANN did not agree to meet these demands
and chose the strategy described above. The registries are also not
of one mind, and the chances are that some will defect and sign a
negotiated contract, while others will hold out for more.
The Department of Commerce has also initially reduced its
support of ICANN by renewing its contract for a shorter period in
2002,81 while Congress held hearings that allowed criticisms of
ICANN to be heard from witnesses, including the General Ac-
counting Office, as well as members of the Congressional
committee.
In September 2003, the Department of Commerce extended
the agreement for another three years. The Department stated
81 Internet Oversight Body Wins One More Year of Life, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake
City, Utah), Sept. 21, 2002, at B10, LEXIS, News Library, AllNews File (noting that the
Department granted a one-year renewal - until Sept. 30, 2003 - the third renewal of the
contract). The Department expressed disappointment in ICANN's progress on the con-
tract tasks but "consider[ed] the organization's recent broad reform efforts to be a substan-




that "[w]hile numerous issues and substantial challenges confront
ICANN, the organization has made notable progress toward
achieving the goals of the [agreement] in the start-up phase of its
existence," and noted that "the agreement included 'key' provi-
sions to ensure that ICANN developed into an independent, stable
and sustainable organization capable of technically managing the
domain name system." The Department noted ICANN's recent
reforms but said that "much work remains. "82
There is no strategic consensus among ICANN's main power
holders: the governments, the ccTLD registries, the United States
Department of Commerce and the Congressional committee in
charge of monitoring the naming system. Not all believe that their
strategy is optimal. However, there is another lack of equilibrium
that strengthens ICANN's power - the disagreement between the
United States and other foreign countries with respect to the con-
trol of the root. There is no consensus among the European
Union, other countries, and the United States with respect to the
"internationalization" of the root and the extent to which the
United States should control the root.8 3 Any fundamental change
in ICANN's identity may allow for an open reconsideration of the
power position of the United States. As long as ICANN's function
as the guardian and manager of the root is not on the negotiation
table, the United States' utility is met. That, however, allows the
United States to negotiate, through ICANN, its behavior or
processes or even the extent of its power. For example, there is no
reason why ICANN should determine issues concerning control of
information. There are other bodies, both in the United States and
in other countries, that can determine these issues and there is no
need for uniformity - at least no immediate need - on this score.
We can, therefore, expect the United States to continue to
maintain ICANN, to be sensitive to the demands of the other coun-
tries, and to curb ICANN's ambitions. The United States can af-
ford, and has the ability, by contract, to limit ICANN's desires to
acquire centralized discretionary control over anything that might
82 Agencies, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Sept. 18, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, AllNews
File. The agreement includes "milestones" for ICANN, including a new strategic plan by
the end of the year, a contract audit compliance program by June 30, and a contingency
plan in the event of a severe disruption of its operations. ICANN also is required to
continue seeking agreements with ccTLD operators and to implement, by December 31,
2004, an appropriate long-term strategy for selecting new TLDs.
83 See, e.g., Monika Ermert, Speakers Seek Full Internationalization of ICANN During
WSIS Panel, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Mar. 5, 2004, LEXIS, News Library, AllNews File.
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possibly relate to the Internet naming and numbering system, and
to use this ever expanding control and operations as a source of
ever expanding funding. To be sure, an idealistic view of ICANN is
unrealistic. It does not make ICANN better and stronger. But
then, there are some people and institutions that would not wish
ICANN to be stronger. In their opinion the weaker it is, the better
it will be.
The tension and the bargaining areas are likely to center not
on finding alternatives to ICANN. They are likely to focus on de-
fining ICANN's power, weakening its appetite for establishing pol-
icies, and limiting its budget. In that area, the United States and
other countries may reach an agreement, which ICANN will be
forced to follow. If, however, the United States and the other
countries insist on their demands for controlling the root in terms
of geography and servicers, they may be forced into the existing
equilibrium and into far greater threats that would be far more
costly to each in attempting to win.
One last possibility that looms in the background of this saga
is the development of an alternative naming system that would be
more suitable to the Internet of today and tomorrow. There are
scientists that are working on such a system, and when this is
achieved, the problems of the present will be those of the past;
ICANN may become entirely obsolete, and new problems are
likely to emerge. Unlike new fuel, whose introduction might re-
quire massive capital investments, and cause the obsolescence of
an enormous amount of existing investments, a change in the nam-
ing system will involve very little of each in terms of money but
much more, perhaps, in terms of knowledge. But if the knowledge
can be acquired while the people in control remain in control, the
transition may be far easier and more acceptable.
II. CONCLUSION
While ICANN was hailed as a new design, and to some extent
it is, there is nothing fundamentally new about it, except that it has
not yet matured. Every governance model contains flexibility as
well as structure. From free markets84 to the most rigid dictator-
ship, some actions are left to the actors and are not prescribed from
above. It seems that even chaotic systems have some structures,
84 Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and Prop-
erty Law, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 389 (1993).
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such as fractals.85 The governance of the Internet naming system
has not yet found the balance between structure and flexibility, be-
tween principles upon which people negotiate and negotiations
where "anything goes" depending on muscle and wile. There is no
balance as yet between strategic techniques designed to gain ad-
vantages for the parties (usually short-term) and a long-term view
of the ultimate goals of the organization. There is little balance
between a self-limiting approach to power as opposed to a drive for
expansion of power, between the imposition of uniformity and
"best practices" and room for individual and organizational
experiments.
Do the issues discussed in this paper indicate a potential for
developing patterns of behavior that can materialize as rules gov-
erning all parties involved in the naming system, or even the rules
governing the relationships between governments and their regis-
tries? As long as the parties depend on ICANN, and as long as
their relationship with ICANN is established by contracts or by
participation in some related organization, the odds of rules evolv-
ing are quite slim. Each of these forms allows for negotiations
rather than consensus-building. Nonetheless, it seems that some
conclusions can be reached with respect to the relationships be-
tween governments and their registries.
The governments and the registries are likely to agree on a
relationship without much interference by ICANN. That is be-
cause ICANN's power over the relationships is limited to changes
in the identity of the delegates who operate the ccTLDs. If the
delegates are government organizations then the changes in per-
sonnel will hardly ever be subject to ICANN's interference. As
between the parties, it is very likely that the emerging rules will
grant the governments full power over the ccTLDs. The govern-
ments' stronger position at ICANN, their close relationships with
the U. S. Department of State, and their deeper commitment to
their country names, suggest that the registries would become le-
gally, or in reality, the governments' agents. The Australian experi-
ence suggests that the registries' status as private professionals
offering public service is giving way to a far more controlled status
85 See, e.g., Michael J. Martinez, Fractals Flowing Online, at http://abcnews.go.com/sec-
tions/tech/CuttingEdge/fractals990316.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2003) (noting the identifi-
cation of structures (fractals) within the chaotic system of the Internet information transfer
and working on using these fractals to build mathematical models that would help predict
the behavior of this chaotic system and gain efficiencies).
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in the service of the countries' political and business interests. Un-
less the registries could organize and establish a countervailing
power at ICANN, and perhaps even if they succeed in doing so,
they will not be able to overcome the strong pressure of national
governments to comply with the governments' policies.
The real conflict, which is currently relatively latent, will arise
when the governments demand "internationalization" of the In-
ternet in terms of language and staffing of ICANN. The real con-
flict seems to be between the governments and the United States.
If the United States values the control of the root, it may have to
reduce ICANN's powers over this task, and agree that other mat-
ters will be determined by one or more organizations. For exam-
ple, the ITU could provide a platform for negotiations among
governments and other constituencies, while technical organiza-
tions can perform the technical services that ICANN currently per-
forms through the same organizations as independent contractors.
The important questions remain: will the current style of con-
tract-negotiations for private laws lead to a more predictable gov-
ernance structure? Will this system gain wide acceptance,
legitimacy and respect? Or will this style lead to the production of
"private laws" that depend on the power balance of the parties and
the pressures of outside parties at the particular time?
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